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Abstract 
This study examines the association between political patronage and banks’ financing 
decision in a sample of 34 commercial banks operating in Middle East and North Africa 
region for the period 2003-2014. Linear and nonlinear Panel Data analysis is used to 
investigate this relationship. The results reveal that politically backed banks tend to be more 
leveraged. Additionally, the indirect effect of political patronage on leverage is found to be 
not so large but significant through interaction with profitability, that is, politically backed 
banks with higher profitability are positively associated with leverage. Our findings imply that 
the privileges resulting from political ties in terms of market power and easier access to 
financing sources make banks more profitable and this also leads to higher leverage. In line 
with the related literature, a strong political presence in the board of banks can be considered 
as an important intangible asset enabling banks to draw more direct rents from the 
government which would not otherwise be available; also, as one of the factors driving bank 
financing decisions.  
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Do political connections affect banks' leverage? Evidence from 
some Middle Eastern and North African countries 
 
1. Introduction 
Relationship capitalism is basically where a lot more is done through contacts and personal 
relationships rather than through contracts. These arrangements are particularly common in 
developing countries with high level of corruption and where the legal system is unreliable 
and the law doesn't require the information disclosure on which competitive finance depends. 
For example, Gomez and Jomo (1997) have discussed the case of Malaysia which is 
representative of economies characterized by a significant influence of political patronage in 
business, corruption, and abuse of power by politicians and report close links between 
business and politics. According to Fisman (2001), Political patronage is an important 
institutional feature of the East Asian economies as well as other emerging countries where it 
is widespread and accepted as a “fact of life”. Particularly, connections between firms and 
politicians have been the focus of a number of studies in recent years. 
A stream of finance research has examined the economic benefits of political connections for 
firms and provides evidence that political engagement might be used as a form of insurance 
against financial crises. For example, politically connected firms are more likely to receive 
support from the government in times of economic distress. Ebrahim et al. (2014) suggest 
that, during the financial crisis, firms with political patronage are believed to recover better 
from crisis. Regarding the various works done by researchers, political patronage not only 
affects firm value but also has a significant impact on leverage (Lim et al., 2012; Bliss & Gul, 
2012). Prior studies have estimated the value of political ties in the context of the Malaysian 
firms. Although most of the results favor the statement that close ties with government or 
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politicians is considered as a helping hand, some existing studies come to the opposite 
conclusion. On the one hand, there are several benefits of political connections including 
easier access to financial resources such as bank loans and others funds at more convenient 
conditions (Fraser et al., 2006; Khwaja & Mian, 2005); improved performance (Johnson & 
Mitton, 2003); a higher probability of bail-out (Faccio, 2006) and lower cost equity capital 
(Boubakri et al., 2012). On the other hand, some studies find that political patronage 
negatively impacts firms by decreasing accounting information quality (Chaney et al., 2011); 
decreasing efficiency (Boubakri et al., 2012); Leuz, 2006); decreasing long-term performance 
(Claessens et al., 2008; Fan et al., 2007). However, few studies paid attention on its role in 
firms' financing decisions. For example, Faccio (2006), Fraser et al. (2006), Johnson & 
Mitton (2003), Lim et al. (2012) and Bliss & Gul (2012) have focused on the linkage between 
political patronage and capital structure and support the evidence that firms with political 
patronage tend to carry more debt. This evidence may concern non-financial firms as well as 
financial institutions in general and banks. Thus, we raise an important question in this study: 
Does political patronage drives the financing decisions of commercial banks? 
As banks play a critical role on the entire economy, it is worthwhile to investigate whether the 
relationship between political connections and firm’s leverage is still effective for banks. 
Moreover, previous researches are mostly related to bank activity and performance (Braun 
and Raddatz, 2010; Carretta et al., 2012 and Nys et al., 2015). We extend the limited 
literature by examining the impact of this connectedness on banks’ financing choices which is 
yet an explored topic. Secondly, we explore more channels of political patronage rather than 
linking ownership structure and banks’ behavior directly. There is a necessity to study 
government ownership from the perspective of boards instead of just ownership structure.  
To address these issues, we select commercial banks from Middle East and North Africa 
(MENA) region. This environment offers a suitable setting for our study to examine the role 
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of political connections that are highly relevant in emerging economies. Using a sample of 34 
commercial banks operating in MENA region over the period 2003 to 2014 and Panel Data 
analysis, the results reveal that the direct link between leverage and political connections is 
positive. 
we find that politically connected banks are more leveraged than non-connected banks and 
this is consistent with the results of Johnson and Mitton (2003), Fraser et al. (2006) and Dong 
et al. (2010). The main argument behind this evidence is that political connections could be a 
valuable resource for banks enabling them to more easily access to debt financing as they are 
considered as implicit guarantee that the government would rescue them in case of distress. 
Another interesting finding is that politically backed banks with higher profitability appears to 
be more leveraged. Furthermore, our study contributes to the literature of bank leverage. It is 
important to consider political patronage as one of the factors driving bank financing 
decisions which makes the persistence of high leverage in banks an interesting issue. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. The next section briefly reviews the literature. It 
contains sub-sections on capital structure and the role of political patronage in banking. The 
third section describes data, sample selection and research design. The results of our 
estimation are reported in the fourth section while the final section concludes the study. 
 
2. Research background 
2.1. Capital structure in financial institutions 
In the wake of financial crises experienced by the banking industry, capital structure has 
drawn much attention from regulators, practitioners and academics. Banks have been 
resettling their capital structure, and academics have been reflecting about the level and 
composition of capital that banks should hold. Besides, policy makers have been called to 
adjust regulation of financial institutions and force banks to hold more equity.  
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There is no clear definition of capital structure also known as leverage in the academic 
literature, but determinants of capital structure are well documented (Gropp & Heider, 2010; 
Frank & Goyal, 2009). Capital Structure is the combination of debts and equity amounts used 
by different firms or Banks.  However, recent empirical evidence suggests that banks have a 
far richer liability structure than a simple mix of equity and deposits. Gropp & Heider (2010) 
examine the composition of banks’ liabilities and find that non-deposit liabilities constituted 
about 30% in total book assets of European banks in 2004. Consequently, determinants of 
capital structure from pecking order or trade-off theories (Myers, 1984) explain some 
variation in banks’ capital structure but both theories ignore important characteristics of 
banking industries (deposits, deposits insurance and government guarantees).  
A key departure of our work pertains to the evidence that banks and other financial 
institutions are highly leveraged and this is related to the main activity of banks. By providing 
loans and receiving deposits, banks are allowed to finance their activity with high level of 
debt and low level of equity. However, there is disagreement about what drives the financing 
decisions of banks. Going back to Gropp & Heider (2010) debt might be preferable for banks 
for some of the theoretical reasons related to the standard corporate finance theories: (i) the 
tax benefits for banks are larger than for non-financial firms, (ii) bankruptcy costs for banks 
are smaller, (iii) agency problems in banks push them into the direction of more leverage, or 
(iv) asymmetric information is more important for banks raising the cost of issuing equity. 
Furthermore, a number of recent researches have studied the reason for high leverage of 
banks, for example, Thakor (2014) proposes some of the theoretical reasons for banks 
preference for high leverage and discuss how capital structures of banks respond to changes in 
taxes. In line Modigliani & Miller (1963), he supports the evidence that banks like other firms 
enjoy tax advantage on debt interest payments relative to dividends on equity and this makes 
high leverage attractive. Moreover, since banks use much higher leverage than non-financial 
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firms do, the corporate tax benefits of debt are particularly important for bank liability 
structure. According to Juks (2010), debt provides tax shield to banks so it might be 
preferable to equity because interest rate expenses can be deducted from the taxable income 
while dividends are not tax deductible. DeAngelo & Stulz (2015) provide evidence that banks 
may choose to be highly levered because of market frictions that lead banks to play a central 
role in the production of liquidity, which is highly socially valuable and thus earns a market 
premium. Gornall & Strebulaev (2013) assuming that the relative mix of deposits and debt are 
exogenously given and that banks pay no premium on deposit insurance, report that high 
leverage arises from low volatility of bank assets due to diversification. Allen et al. (2015) 
justify high leverage of banks that hold only deposits and equity by providing a theoretical 
foundation for why bank equity capital is costly relative to deposits and for how its cost varies 
with the optimal capital structure. Another reason why banks may prefer high leverage is 
based on bailouts and deposit insurance. Bailouts create moral hazard for banks and can lead 
banks to choose more levered capital structures. Gornall & Strebulaev (2013) discuss how 
these forms of government rents can change bank capital structure and show that high levels 
of deposit insurance or high bailout probabilities lead banks into dramatic risk incentives. 
2.2. Political patronage 
Political patronage refers to political leaders or government using their power to grant 
economic favors such as support, encouragement, privilege, or financial aid to connected 
firms in order to achieve the nation's economic goals. According to Faccio (2006) politics 
remarkably influences business particularly in countries with high level of corruption, weak 
legal systems, and poor governance. Notably, many countries across the MENA region have 
specific characteristics (political, social and economic). But the region generally performs 
lower than other states in terms of transparency, accountability and control of corruption. 
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Particularly, political patronage is widespread in these countries and widely accepted as a 
“fact of life” (Chêne, 2008). A politically connected firm could be a group of large 
shareholders, such as the CEO, president, vice president, chairman or secretary, who control 
at least 10 percent of voting share, and are connected with a politician, party, minister, or 
Parliament member (Faccio, 2006). Faccio (2010) find that the financial characteristics of 
connected firms differ more from those of their non-connected peers and that the influence of 
political connections occurred more often in emerging countries characterized by high levels 
of corruption and less developed financial system. 
Furthermore, there is evidence that political linkages may also affect firms’ financing 
decision. One of the first studies investigating the relation between political patronage and 
capital structure belongs to Fraser et al. (2006) who focuses on developing economies and 
uses three measures as proxies of political patronage to find a positive and significant link 
between leverage and political ties. He also suggests that larger and profitable firms with 
political patronage tend to carry more debt than mere firms with political patronage. Dong et 
al (2010) also hypothesize that Chinese firms with stronger political connection should carry 
more debt. Empirical results support this hypothesis: long term debt ratios are positively 
related to firm size and asset tangibility but negatively related to profitability and growth 
opportunities, and tend to be higher for those politically connected firms. Additionally, Lim et 
al (2012) examine the effect of political patronage on capital structure of listed companies on 
the Shanghai Stock Exchange. He hypothesized that Chinese firms with stronger political 
connections should carry more debts. Beside determinants such as firm size, growth 
opportunities, profitability and asset tangibility, state ownership and large number of non-
tradable shares can influence the choice of capital structure. Bliss & Gul (2012) extend the 
work of Fraser et al. (2006) and find that Malaysian politically connected firms have negative 
equity, market-to-book ratio is positively associated with leverage, and borrowing politically 
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connected firms have significantly lower profitability compared to non-connected firms. In 
fact, politically connected firms are perceived by lenders as being of higher risk and are 
charged higher interest rates. A more recent study, Ebrahim et al. (2014) determine the 
optimal capital structure of Malaysian firms on the basis of a set of “core factors”; namely, 
size, profitability, tangibility, investment opportunities, an industry benchmark for target 
leverage, and business risk and gauge the effect of political patronage on firms' financing 
decisions. The results are as follows: During the crisis, firms amend capital structure and 
politically patronized firms de-lever quicker. In recovery period, patronized firms are highly 
leveraged but results are insignificant and there is no difference concerning the core factors of 
capital structures of patronized and non-connected firms. 
This evidence may concern non-financial firms as well as financial institutions in general and 
banks specifically. In fact, banks invest in political connections because the benefits these 
connections would provide are higher than the cost banks would bear. A handful of recent 
literature recognizes the value of political presence on the board of banks and its impact on 
performance (Braun & Raddatz, 2010; Micco et al., 2007), lending and risk taking behavior 
as well as bank’s activity (Carretta et al., 2012; Nys et al., 2015). However, little attention has 
been addressed to the relationship between political patronage and banks’ capital structure. 
 
3. Research design 
3.1. Data and sample Selection 
Financial data for banks are taken from the Bankscope database. In order to have 
homogeneous sample, we included only commercial banks. We used a sample of unbalanced 
panel of 34 banks (1) operating in 6 MENA countries: Tunisia, Egypt, Lebanon, Iran, Yemen 
and Jordan that corresponds to 408 banks-year observations distributed in the 2003-2014 
period. 
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3.2. variables definition 
The literature documents firms’ characteristic having a significant positive or negative 
relationship in determining a company’s leverage based on the traditional capital structure 
theories. In addition, to proxy for political patronage, we follow the most commonly used 
measure of political connections as in Nys et al. (2015) which is government officials and 
politicians on the board of directors. We consider two kinds of politically connected banks: 
the first ones are state-owned banks and the second ones are private banks which have at least 
one of their owners or directors who is a politician or former/current government official as 
well as cases of informal ties to a politician, minister or government official. We take several 
steps to classify politically connected private banks. First, we gather the names of bank 
directors and shareholders from banks’ websites and financial statements. Second, we 
manually collect detailed information on their political backgrounds from individuals’ 
biographies and curriculum vitae from various websites. 
We present in Table 1 the variables that will be used in the equation. 
Table1. Definition of variables 
variables measure definition 
Dependent variable   
Leverage (lev) 
 
leverage ratio =1- equity/total assets 
Independent variables   
Profitability (prof) Return on Average Asset =net income/total average assets 
Risk net loans to total asset =net loans/ total assets 
Size logarithm of total asset =log (total assets) 
Asset Growth (growth) change in the % of asset =Assett-Assett-1/Assett 
Tangibility (tang) fixed asset to total asset =fixed assets/total assets 
Political Connection (pol) dummy =1 if bank is politically connected; 
=0 otherwise 
 
 
(1) List of banks used in our sample is presented in appendix A. 
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3.3.  Econometric model 
In order to examine whether politically backed banks in MENA region are associated with 
high level of debt, we estimate the relationship between leverage as a proxy of capital 
structure and its key determinants by reference to existing literature on the determinants of 
capital structure. In addition, we add the variable that is proxy for political connections as a 
dummy variable. For this purpose, we apply panel data analysis available in STATA software. 
The static methods neglect the effect of lagged values of the dependent variable. Therefore, 
we specify a dynamic panel data model and we use the GMM initially proposed by Arellano 
& Bond (1991) and later developed by Arellano & Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond 
(1998) by adding a lagged dependent variable as follows: 
         (1)-1 1 2 4 5 6lev c lev prof risk a tang size growth polit it it it 3 it it it it i it                  
Where i=1 to 34 and t=1 to 12 represent the bank dimension and year respectively; c is the 
constant coefficient; 𝞭 the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable is the estimated 
persistent coefficient of leverage banks; α1 to α6 are the regression coefficients of 
independent variables; vi and εit are the unobserved bank-specific effect, and the error term. 
We assume that vi and εit are independently distributed across i and E(vi) =0, E(εit) =0, E (vi 
εit) =0 for i=1,..,N and t=1,..,T and E(εit εis)=0 for i=1,..,N and t≠s. 
The extended method is known as the system GMM (sys-GMM). It includes a regression 
equation in both differences and levels, each one with its set of instrumental variables. The 
rationale for the use of this specification is to provide instrumentation for endogenous 
regressors and improve precision. However, the failure of the model is that in practice, when 
including the lagged dependent variable as explanatory variable, the dynamics of the 
dependent variable is almost entirely captured by its lag. Therefore, we lose the link with the 
other explanatory variables, which nevertheless can explain both the dependent variable and 
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the lagged dependent variable. But as they explain the lagged dependent variable, and the 
latter explains the dependent variable, the model no longer needs the other variables implicitly 
included in the lagged variable. Hence, there is no need to specify dynamic panel model. We 
adopt cross-sectional time-series regression models when the disturbance term is first-order 
autoregressive following Baltagi & Wu (1999). Two panel estimation methods are performed 
using a within estimator with AR (1) errors (Within-FE) and a generalized least square 
random effect with AR (1) errors (GLS-RE). Our regression equation is as follows: 
                  (2)
2 3 4 5 6
                           where    
, 1
Y c prof a risk a tang a size a growth a pol
it it it it it it it i it
it i t it
 
  
        
 

 
Where |𝜌| < 1 and ηit is independent and identically distributed (i.i.d) with mean 0 and 
variance 𝜎η
2. If 𝜐i is assumed to be fixed parameters, the model is a fixed effects model. If 𝜐i is 
assumed to be realizations of i.i.d process with mean 0 and variance 𝜎υ
2, it is a random-effects 
model.  
In order to choose between the FE and the RE we apply the Hausman (1978) test for 
specification. It tests the null hypothesis that the coefficients estimated by the efficient 
random effects estimator are the same as the ones estimated by the consistent fixed effect 
estimator. If the null hypothesis is rejected then we use fixed effect model because random 
effect model is inconsistent. An additional test should be conducted to test the presence of 
autocorrelation in our specification, the Baltagi-Wu locally best invariant (LBI) statistic for 
serial autocorrelation, which is a suitable diagnostic for unbalanced panels (Baltagi & Wu, 
1999). The values of the statistic are between 0 and 4, a value of 2 indicates no 
autocorrelation, if it is less than 2 then it would indicate positive serial correlation. 
Finally, in order to obtain more concluding results, it is important to test for possible 
nonlinear effects of the explanatory variables on leverage. Therefore, we will extend the 
model (2) to take into account the squared variables in the regression equation as well as the 
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crossed variables. The starting point to choose the best specification is to estimate the 
equation including all variables. The general specification is as follows: 
6 6 6 6
2
, , , ,
1 1 1 1
           (3)it j j it j j it jk j it k it i it
j j j k
Y c X X X X    
   
          
Where Y is the dependent variable; Xj and Xk are two different explanatory variables; c is the 
constant coefficient; α, β and θ are the regression coefficients of independent variables; vi and 
εit are the unobserved bank-specific effect and the error term. 
 
4. Research findings 
In this section, we present and interpret our results in detail with the aim of drawing the 
conclusions of our sample of MENA banks. Within the framework, we present descriptive 
statistics and correlation analyses of the variables used during the estimation of the model. 
4.1. Summary statistics 
Table 2 summarizes all the descriptive statistics (average, standard deviation, maximal value 
and minimal value) relative to variables used in the present study. 
Table 2.  Descriptive statistics of the variables 
Variables Obs Mean Standard 
deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
lev 374 89.60481 
(0.332054) 
6.370637 51.383 103.942 
prof 374 1.123791 
(0.0758622) 
1.423259 -9.92 12.988 
risk 374 48.14241 
(1.080944) 
20.68997 4.432 90.498 
tang 372 1.884208 
(0.081413) 
1.531093 .1829424 15.26072 
growth 363 14.85796 
(0.7809317) 
14.90129 -21.85 94.87 
size 374 3.244871 
(0.049288) 
0.9222934 -0.016884 4.805403 
pol 384 0.6223958 
(0.0256804) 
0.4854203 0 1 
              Note: standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Along with the descriptive statistics, a correlation matrix between the variables used is also 
presented. Table 3 summarizes the results relative to the correlation. Leverage is negatively 
correlated with all variables except for size and political patronage. Also, the results show that 
the coefficients of correlation do not exceed the value of 0.5, so that does not cause problems 
during the estimation. 
Table 3. Correlation matrix of the variables 
 lev prof risk tang growth size pol 
lev 1.0000       
prof -0.4094* 1.0000      
 (0.0000)       
risk -0.1152* -0.1445* 1.0000     
 (0.0259) (0.0051)      
tang -0.1114* 0.0180 0.2259* 1.0000    
 (0.0317) (0.7289) (0.0000)     
growth -0.1379* 0.2534* -0.0570 0.2309* 1.0000   
 (0.0085) (0.0000) (0.2789) (0.0000)    
size 0.3431* -0.1390* -0.1500* -0.5074* -0.4087* 1.0000  
 (0.0000) (0.0071) 0.0036 (0.0000) 0.0000   
pol 0.0869 0.0219 0.0915 -0.0182 -0.1709* 0.3323* 1.0000 
 (0.0933) (0.6733) (0.0773) (0.7257) (0.0011) (0.0000)  
Note: the significance level of each correlation coefficient are in parentheses. *denote the statistical 
significant at the 5% level or better. 
 
In addition, a test of multicollinearity is performed, the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF). 
Table 4 provide the results of collinearity diagnostics of the variables. The problem of 
multicollinearity is detected if VIF has a value of 5 or 10 and above and / or the average of 
VIF is greater than or equal to 2. In this case, the VIF values vary between (1.14) and (1.96) 
and the average equals to (1.40). This implies the absence of the problem of multi-
collinearity. 
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Table 4. Collinearity diagnostics of the variables 
variable VIF 
lev 1.39 
prof 1.33 
risk 1.14 
tang 1.45 
growth 1.30 
size 1.96 
pol 1.20 
Mean VIF 1.40 
 
 
4.2. Estimation results 
In our work, we proceed to different estimations obtained using Dynamic Panel System by 
System Generalized Method of Moments (sys-GMM) for both one-step and two-step 
methods, GLS random effects estimator with AR (1) errors (GLS-RE) and Within estimator 
fixed effects (Within-FE). To pursue our analysis, we present the results of the regressions on 
panel data while specifying the various statistical tests made during this study. 
Table 5 presents the estimation results of model (1). The Dynamic Panel Data model is 
estimated by System GMM estimator in two stages. Our results of system GMM are robust 
for the following reasons. First, the instruments used in our regressions are valid, because the 
Sargan test does not reject the hypothesis of validity of the instruments. In addition, we note 
that there is no second-order autocorrelation of the errors AR (2), because the second-order 
autocorrelation test of Arellano and Bond does not reject the hypothesis of absence of second-
order autocorrelation. We can observe that the lagged dependent variable enters positively and 
statistically significant in the GMM system equation, and the magnitude of the coefficient is 
high (from 0.75 to 0.77). This result indicates that debt is associated to more debt and the 
lagged value of leverage is an important determinant of present values. On the other hand, the 
explanatory variables are not statistically significant both in one step and two step estimation. 
Only tangibility and profitability coefficients keep the same sign and are significant at 1%. 
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Table 5. Dynamic Panel Data estimation   
variables                     one-step system GMM two-step system GMM 
 coefficients standard errors t-statistics coefficients standard errors t-statistics 
Levt-1 0.754863*** .0492238 15.34 0.774192*** 
 
.0352113 21.99 
prof -0.667546*** .1616133 -4.13       -0.612103*** 
 
.0671246 -9.12 
risk -0.0248254 
 
.0221679 -1.12 -0.0200224* 
 
.0091995 -2.18 
tang -1.00732*** 
 
.1815065 -5.55 -1.05986*** 
 
.0586196 -18.08 
growth -0.0011117 
 
.0162149 -0.07 0.0027738 
 
.0047822 0.58 
size 0.3599736 
 
.6376371 0.56 0.0780202 
 
.2457904 0.32 
pol -2.002145 
 
1.740597 -1.15 -2.320133 
 
1.260156 -1.84 
c 25.7777*** 
 
4.379724 5.89  24.8999*** 
 
 2.81133 8.86 
Wald 
chi2(7) 
Prob>chi2 
499.55518*** 
0.000 
16680.536*** 
0.000 
Sargan test 
Chi2(64) 
Prob>chi2 
 
147.35043*** 
0.000 
 
25.190552 
1.000 
AR (1) 
p-value 
- -1.8751558 
0.0608 
AR (2) 
p-value 
- -1.3046008 
0.1920 
Note: dependent variable=lev; *, **, and *** denote the statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 per cent test 
levels, respectively. 
 
As we have argued previously, when including the lagged dependent variable as 
explanatory variable, the dynamics of the dependent variable is almost entirely captured by its 
lag. Therefore, two panel estimation methods are performed using a within estimator with AR 
(1) errors (Within-FE) and a generalized least square random effect with AR (1) errors (GLS-
RE) as presented in Table 6. Statistically, the general accepted way of choosing between fixed 
and random effects is running Hausman test, based on test result, the estimation of the random 
effects model is inconsistent and we must retain the estimation of the fixed effects model in 
which the variable of political connection is significant. Besides, we obtain the modified 
Bhargava et al. (1982) Durbin-Watson (DW) statistic and Baltagi-Wu (LBI) statistic. Based 
on these statistics, both tests reject the null hypothesis of no first order serial correlation and 
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the models were estimated taking this into account. The results from the Fixed effects model 
show that tangibility and profitability are significant and negatively related to leverage, while 
political connection and size have a positive relationship with leverage. We notice that banks 
with higher political connection tend to have higher leverage in their corporate financing 
structure. But, the variable of political connection is significant at only 10% level. 
Table 6. Estimation of Panel Data model with AR (1) disturbance 
Variables 
 
fixed effects with AR (1) errors random effects with AR (1) errors 
coefficients Standard 
errors 
t-statistics coefficients Standard 
errors 
t-statistics 
prof -0.34147* 0.139345 -2.45 -0.5848*** 0.117565 -4.97 
risk  0.02707 0.027120 1.00 -0.01431 0.019429 -0.74 
tang -0.7267*** 0.173856 -4.18 -0.9078*** 0.141949 -6.40 
growth -0.02495 0.013151 -1.90 0.00485 0.010102 0.48 
size 20.6816*** 1.340789 15.43 0.28154 0.749162 0.38 
pol 5.7214* 2.754286 2.08 1.1918 1.37549 0.87 
c 18.0523*** 1.46072 12.36 91.1851*** 2.738649 33.30 
Within R² 
Between R² 
Overall R² 
0.558 
0.1456 
0.1183 
0.1306 
0.0956 
0.1135 
DW statistic 
0.804176 0.804176 
LBI statistic 1.187850 1.1878506 
AIC(1) 
BIC(2) 
1.578.5582 
1605.0879 
- 
- 
Hausman Chi2 
p-value 
773.19 
0.000 
Note: dependent variable=lev; *, **, and *** denote the statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 per cent test 
levels, respectively. (1)Akaike Information Criteria. (2) Bayesian Information Criteria. 
 
The estimation of model (3) was used to test the statistical significance of explanatory 
variables (original, quadratic and crossed). Then, through an iterative elimination of 
statistically insignificant coefficient, we restart the regression with one less insignificant 
variable. We repeat the procedure of estimation until we end with 10 significant variables as 
shown in equation (4): 
1 2 3 1 2 1
2 2 3 4
² ² *
* * * *         (4)    
it it it it
it it it it i it
lev c prof growth size risk size prof size
prof growth prof pol risk size tang growth
     
     
      
     
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By observing the table 7 which summarizes the estimation results relative to model (4) that 
includes the quadratic and interactive terms of the explanatory variables, we notice that there 
are 10 significant variables. In addition, an estimation of model (4) with standardized 
variables is added to the results of table 7 to remove the effect of the unit of measure. The 
estimated coefficients are relative to the contribution of corresponding variables on the model. 
Table 7. Estimation of fixed effects model with AR (1) disturbance (nonlinear model 
restricted to the significant variables) 
 Model with raw variables Model with standardized variables 
variables 
coefficients Standard 
errors 
t-statistics coefficients Standard 
errors 
t-statistics 
prof 2.404596*** .3296212 7.30 0.415416*** 0.080199 5.18 
growth 0.061694*** .0144305 4.28 0.175297*** 0.034237 5.12 
size 45.17926*** 3.138123 14.40 3.107970** 1.061148 2.93 
Prof*size -1.055038*** 0.117756 -8.96 -0.553295*** 0.078449 -7.05 
Prof*growth  -0.013467** 0.004410 -3.05 -0.106118** 0.036618 -2.90 
Prof*pol   0.706390** 0.247567 2.85 0.108872** 0.040160 2.71 
Risk*size - 0.052156** 0.016029 -3.25 -0.454187* 0.193258 -2.35 
Tang*growth -0.019406*** 0.00343 -5.66 -0.208979*** 0.033291 -6.28 
Risk² 0.001852*** 0.000496 3.73 0.418845* 0.162387 2.58 
Size² -5.482681*** 0.736171 -7.45 -2.007541* 0.862467 -2.33 
c 8.186444*** 1.225873 6.68 -0.053870* 0.023917 -2.25 
Within R² 
Between R² 
Overall R² 
0.6984 
0.1590 
0.1491 
0.3418 
0.1535 
0.1619 
DW statistic 0.836441 0.8364 
LBI statistic 1.147743 1.147743 
AIC(1) 
BIC(2) 
1447.1774 
1488.867 
224.1561 
265.8457 
Note: dependent variable=lev; *, **, and *** denote the statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 per cent test 
levels, respectively. (1)Akaike Information Critera. (2) Bayesian Information Criterion. 
 
There are a number of difference in the results obtained in this estimation compared to those 
reported in the previous estimation reported in table 6. First, coefficients of profitability, 
tangibility and size are significant at 1% and positive indicating a direct and positive link 
between these variables and leverage. But, the direct effect of political connection on the 
dependent variable is no longer visible. Second, the coefficients of the squared variables 
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relative to risk and size are significant indicating the presence nonlinear effect of risk and size 
on leverage. The quadratic specification results in a significance of the coefficient of risk 
which is not the case in the linear model. This is consistent with the possibility that the 
relationship between leverage and risk may not be monotonic. As far as the coefficient of size 
is positive in the linear specification. The inclusion of the size-squared variable however, 
results in a significant reversal in the sign of the coefficient, indicating that the effect of bank 
size on leverage is non-linear. Accounting for the non-linear effect, the positive coefficient on 
the linear size variable is an indication that leverage increases with size. The negative 
coefficient on the quadratic term suggests that debt financing decreases with size. Finally, the 
coefficients of the interactive variables between profitability, size and growth are statistically 
significant. An interesting result is that while there is no direct effect of political on leverage, 
the variable of interaction between profitability and political connection appears to be 
significant at 1% and positive. Hence, there is and indirect effect of political patronage on 
leverage through profitability. 
5. Conclusion 
Various researches have shown that political patronage can be either beneficial or detrimental 
to firms. Our research supports the hypothesis that these connections may affect financing 
decisions of bank. Our main finding that political patronage has positive relationship with 
bank leverage is in accordance with the benefits of being politically backed in banking sector 
such as easier access to loan by firms willing to seek further debt financing than their non-
connected peers (Faccio, 2006). Besides, connections enable firms to enjoy preferential 
treatment by governments to acquire more capital (Khwaja & Mian, 2005). Furthermore, 
political ties could be a valuable resource for banks enabling them to more easily obtain 
resources in the form of deposits. Depositors might perceive these banks as less risky as they 
would be rescued by government in case of distress. Otherwise, we analyzed not only the 
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linear effect of political connections on leverage, but also the nonlinear effect by estimating a 
model that takes into account quadratic and interaction terms as explanatory variables in the 
regression equation. The indirect effect of political patronage on leverage is found to be not so 
large but significant through interactions with other determinants such as profitability. In 
other words, profitable banks with political patronage tend to have more debt. It could be 
argued that one of the benefits of being politically backed is to have higher market power 
enabling banks to charge higher interest rate on loans than non-connected banks, as well as, 
easier access to funding with enjoying lower cost of funds (Braun & Raddatz, 2010; Nys et 
al., 2015), which subsequently leads to higher interest margins and then improves 
profitability. It means that the privileges resulted from political connections make banks more 
profitable which have positive impact on leverage due to larger and easier access to financing 
sources. 
As a conclusion, this research provides insight in the costs and benefits of political 
connections, also, an insight to investors and government in their decision-making process for 
investments or policy making. Due to the importance of banking sector in the economy, it is 
strongly influenced by some political aspects. During crisis, the government have to inject 
capital to banks to avoid the collapse of banking industry. However, politically connected 
banks, having the privilege of being bailed out in case of distress may engage in riskier and 
inefficient activities. The monitoring of these banks by the government should be stronger 
than non-connected banks in terms of risk and efficiency. Moreover, the research gives insight 
to investors when evaluating the risk profile of banks with political patronage. In fact, 
politically patronized banks have lower default risk which might be driven from the 
governmental support rather than lower operating risk or better economic and financial 
conditions, then risk-averse investors should be able to identify companies with such 
characteristics as riskier and have incentives to require higher returns.  
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Appendix A. List of Banks by country 
country banks 
Tunisia ARAB TUNISIAN BANK 
BANQUE DE TUNISIE 
UNION INTERNATIONALE DE BANQUES 
UNION BANCAIRE POUR LE COMMERCE ET L’INDUSTRIE 
BANQUE INTERNATIONALE ARABE DE TUNISIE 
BANQUE NATIONALE AGRICOLE 
SOCIETE TUNISIENNE DE BANQUE 
AMEN BANK 
BANQUE DE L’HABITAT 
ATTIJARI BANK 
Lebanon BANK AUDI 
BANK OF BEIRUT 
BYBLOS BANK 
Egypt BANQUE MISR 
NATIONAL BANK OF EGYPT 
BANK OF ALEXANDRIA 
MISR DEVELOPMENT BANK 
COMMERCIAL INTERNATIONAL BANK 
HSBC BANK EGYPT 
SUEZ BANK 
BANQUE DU CAIRE 
Yemen NATIONAL BANK OF YEMEN 
SABA ISLAMIC BANK 
SHAMIL BANK 
Jordan JORDAN ISLAMIC BANK 
HOUSING BANK OF TRADE AND FINANCE 
CAIRO AMMAN BANK 
JORDAN AHLI BANK 
BANK AL ETIHAD 
Iran BANK TEJARAT 
BANK SADERAT IRAN 
BANK SEPAH 
BANK REFAH 
BANK OF INDUSTRY AND MINE 
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